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Introduction: The Blurred Distance between Us and Them
Poland’s fi lm directors could fi nally forget about the pressures of complying with govern-
ment censorship when communism was pronounced dead in the country on 4 June 1989. 
Th at day, the nation’s fi rst free elections marked the transformation from socialism to cap-
italism and democracy.1) Before long, censors had disappeared, much like the governing 
Party, whose interests they had once represented. According to Edward Zajiček: “[a]s in 
a fairy tale […] fi lmmakers’ dreams came true […] without any interference from outside, 
[…] [they] could now work freely on scripts of their choice”.2) Ironically, as soon as Polish 
cinema underwent full political liberalization, it became clear that in exchange for politi-
cal freedom, it had lost something that was impossible to acquire in a free market environ-
ment: the generous fi nancial support of the old censor, the Communist Party. 
In pre-1989 Poland, fi lm funding was not driven by the market. Popular entertainment 
and art cinema had an equal chance of securing Party support. Instead of commercial po-
tential, the promise of contributing to national culture usually suffi  ced to justify investing 
state monies into feature fi lms, despite the fact that some production capital came from 
revenue generated by earlier releases. Th e Communist Party might have been wary of its 
own political standing but it was also aware of Polish citizens’ appetites for both art and 
entertainment. Careful to preempt accusations of damaging national fi lm culture, the Par-
ty aimed to appear to be committed to its self-proclaimed mission of supporting fi lm. Th e 
bureaucrats who controlled the fi lm industry did not want to be seen as tightfi sted. Many 
of the hard-line socialists oft en subscribed to the view that communist cinema needed to 
1) See Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, vol.2, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) and Ewa Mazierska, ‘Polish martial law of 1981 seen from abroad’, New Cinemas, vol. 7, no. 3 
(2009), pp. 198–9. 
2) Edward Zajiček, Poza ekranem: Kinematografia polska 1918–1991 (Warszawa: Filmoteka Narodowa, Wyda-
wnictwa Filmowe i Artystyczne, 1992), p. 269. The author is responsible for translating all Polish-lanaguage 
quotations into English.
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be given the opportunity to demonstrate its superiority to that produced under capitalism. 
In the early 1990s, when memories of censorship were still relatively fresh, Polish fi lm di-
rector Krzysztof Kieślowski confi rmed: 
I wouldn’t say that clerks only aimed at hampering our efforts, it wasn’t like that … 
People, who acted as film censors, at the same time had cultural ambitions, they 
wanted film culture to exist … So, almost paradoxically, they really cared about film 
and wanted it to be of highbrow quality.3) 
Recognizing the dual-role played by the Party — as censor and patron — helps us to 
explain the various paradoxes that characterized postwar Polish cinema, wherein direc-
tors oft en appeared to bite the very hand that fed them; that of the generous communist 
patron. 
Despite their generosity, Party offi  cials, who typically liaised with top industry profes-
sionals such as directors, producers, screenwriters, and critics before approving narrative 
feature fi lms, were also quite pragmatic. As a rule, once a project had been greenlighted, 
political or ideological concerns were put aside so that fi lm units (zespoły fi lmowe) could 
go about producing a fi lm. Censorship was therefore used to ensure a fi lm would be com-
pleted in a timely fashion. Th e fact that some pre-1989 fi lms were critical of the very po-
litical system that underwrote their production is not evidence of the censors having been 
duped. Rather, it was a case of the Party protecting substantial investments in the fi lm in 
question. Sometimes Party offi  cials would even go as far as to cite artistic merits over ide-
ological concerns in order to ensure that fi lms could be exhibited domestically. Docu-
ments from the Central Committee’s Department of Culture (Wydział Kultury KC PZPR) 
reveal that this situation characterized the release of Man of Marble (1976), Camou-
flage (1976/1977), and Teddy Bear (1980/1981). 4)
Th e late 1990s saw the demise of the state subsidization of fi lm production, with Pol-
ish state television (TVP) taking the responsibility of subsidizing some narrative fi lms. Ac-
cess to the new sources of funding that had been made available by the national broadcast-
er, as well as by the private sector, was usually preconditioned by a project’s capacity to 
generate revenue. Financial security perished with censorship. Concern spread across the 
Polish fi lm community. Th e once prosperous fi lm units looked to survive by transforming 
themselves into small production houses that were subject to the ebbs and fl ows of the 
market. Among them was Film Unit “Tor”, whose head, renowned director Krzysztof 
Zanussi, lamented in 2000:
The time of freedom and market brought speed to our lives, the rhythm that killed 
off our old habit of reflective meetings and non-committing informal chats… I am 
not in a position to predict the fate of filmmaking [in Poland-AM], or, for that ma-
3) Krzysztof Kieślowski featured in the documentary Tren na śmierć cenzora (1992). The published versi-
on of the transcript from the film is available as ‘Tren na śmierć cenzora.’ Reżyser, no. 11 (1992), p. 1.
4) See Anna Misiak, Kinematograf Kontrolowany: Cenzura Filmowa w Kraju Socjalistycznym i Demokratycz-
nym (PRL i USA). Analiza Socjologiczna (Kraków: Universitas, 2006), pp. 297–311.
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tter, the future of Tor, which despite all shortages has remained an enclave of such 
thinking that primarily locates film in the domain of arts, where the industrial side 
of it is only of secondary importance.5)
It took over fi ft een years for the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) to pass 
an act that sanctioned the opening of the Polish Film Institute (2005), which currently of-
fers “complex assistance to fi lm production” and distributes funding to animators, docu-
mentarians, and feature fi lm makers.6) Before the institute was established, a period of eco-
nomic hardship had led to contemplative reassessments of the communist era. Th e sense 
of nostalgia for a  time of fi nancial security and leisurely work pace that is evident in 
Zanussi’s musings was widespread among Polish fi lmmakers. Th ese views stand at odds to 
Western thinking about Polish cinema’s past, which tends to be quite negative about the 
communist management of the fi lm industry and typically pays minimal attention to the 
institutional foundations and practices of the nation’s system of censorship.7) Th e repres-
sive aspects of this system notwithstanding, a more objective and systematic critical as-
sessment of the political control of the Cold War fi lm industry is well over due, especially 
one that is underpinned by archival research. In 1990, the archives of the Department of 
Culture of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Wydział Kultury KC PZPR) 
were opened, thereby providing access to minutes from fi lm-related Party meetings and 
letters documenting exchanges between fi lmmakers and the communist authorities. Th ese 
materials bring to light the negotiations that took place between the offi  cials and fi lm di-
rectors, who usually acted as diplomatic players rather than defenseless victims of censor-
ship. 
During periods of political liberalization and less stringent control of cinema, conces-
sions were made both by fi lmmakers and censors. Such periods included the 1950s Th aw 
(Odwilż) aft er the Stalinist era, when the Polish Film School fl ourished, and at the turn of 
the 1970s and 1980s, which saw the fi rst public screenings of the Cinema of Moral Con-
cern. No decisions on censorship were deemed fi nal because this system of control drew 
individuals from the government (the Ministry of Culture), the fi lm industry, and from 
diff erent levels of the Party, including the Central Committee’s Department of Culture 
(Wydział Kultury KC PZPR), the Central Committee (Komitet Centralny PZPR), and the 
Politburo. Internal checks and balances, as well as criticism of previous management prac-
tices, allowed for decisions to be reconsidered and reversed. Even if a fi lm was shelved, 
there was always a chance that it would be given a reprieve by new leadership. For exam-
ple, under martial law eleven previously released fi lms including such well known titles as 
Shivers (1981), Fever (1980/1981), Index (1977/1981), and Man of Iron (1981) were 
5) Krzysztof Zanussi quoted in Barbara Hollender and Zofia Turowska, Zespół Filmowy Tor (Warszawa: Prós-
zyński i S-ka, 2000), p. 239. 
6) ‘Task and structure’, Polish Film Institute, <http://www.pisf.pl/en/about/structure> [accessed 10 April 
2012].
7) See for example Dina Iordanova, Cinema of the Other Europe: The Industry and the Artistry of East Central 
European Film (London and New York: Wallflower Press, 2003), Marek Haltof, Polish National Cinema (New 
York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003); Richard Taylor et al (eds), The BFI Companion to Eastern Europe-
an Cinema (London: BFI, 2000).
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withdrawn from circulation on 13 December 1981, only to be returned to distribution 
over the next few years, aft er the political climate in the country had calmed.8) Th e Polish 
system of censorship corresponds with Christian Metz’s observation that “[t]he peculiari-
ty of censorship, and one of its most noticeable characteristics—in the absence of which 
we would never be able to grasp its existence—is that things are always managing to get 
past it”.9) It may have been the cause of much frustration but Polish fi lm censorship boast-
ed a fl exible and ever-shift ing character that also off ered fi lmmakers hope. 
Although these historical intricacies are familiar to Polish academics, critics, and au-
diences, they are not discussed in writings produced outside the country. English-lan-
guage scholarship has barely attempted to examine the decision-making processes behind 
Polish censorship. Th e picture that has been painted in the west of the communist control 
of Polish cinema is therefore far from complete. It is also one that is undermined by stere-
otype. As the next section shows, Western critics and academics have invariably sympa-
thized with Polish fi lmmakers. Whether intentionally or otherwise, this tendency has re-
sulted in their interaction being framed as an “us and them” relationship, with fi lmmakers 
placed in opposition to Party censors. In reality, this gap was bridged on countless occa-
sions.
The View from the West
Twenty years aft er the fall of communism in Poland, communist fi lm censorship evident-
ly remains something of an enigma in the English-speaking world. Censors are common-
ly pictured as Kafk aesque bureaucrats who sit in gloomy socialist-realist lairs purging 
completed fi lms of content that strayed from the Party line. Th e sense of repression and 
doom that permeates such images could easily be dismissed were it not for the fact it has 
led to misrepresentation in histories of Polish cinema. Such misconceptions have pro-
duced misunderstandings of the forces driving fi lm production, with notions of artistic as-
piration oft en superseded by images of dissenting fi lmmakers. Consequently, discussions 
of banned fi lms, and production histories that chronicle Polish directors scheming to side-
step the watchful eye of the censor, are multiple. As Dina Iordanova observes, “[i]t is still 
assumed that censored fi lms had a  higher artistic value than those that were not cen-
sored”.10) Th is tendency has led to the valorization of fi lms that criticized communism, 
which in turn explains the cultural prestige attached in the West to fi lms such as Ashes 
and Diamonds (1958), Camera Buff (1979), Interrogation (1982/1989), and Man 
of Marble (1977). Th e latter tells the story of a young documentarian who struggles sin-
gle-handedly against Polish television censorship while looking to uncover the truth be-
hind the oppression of workers in the 1950s. Its depiction of Polish censorship, as menac-
8) ‘Filmy fabularne, których eksploatację wstrzymano po 13 grudnia 1981 roku’, Archiwum Akt Nowych 
w Warszawie, KC PZPR Wydział Kultury, 889/2.
9) Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, trans. Celia Britton et al. (Bloo-
mington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 254.
10) Iordanova, Cinema of the Other Europe, p. 33.
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ing, senseless, and intent on disorientating the viewer, has profoundly infl uenced Western 
understandings of the subject. 
Marek Haltof charts the most important developments in the history of the Polish fi lm 
industry, but pays little attention to mechanisms of control in the country. Haltof ’s occa-
sional discussion of censorship is usually limited to its restriction of creative freedom. Like 
other Anglophone scholars, Haltof uses terms such as “state censorship” but stops short of 
explaining who acted in the name of the state, or how the state implemented control. By 
portraying censorship as a faceless, alienating phenomenon, Haltof neglects to mention 
the extent to which fi lmmakers negotiated with censors, and, in so doing, reproduces the 
“us and them” dichotomy.11)
English-language scholarship has also barely examined the institutional structure of 
Polish fi lm censorship.12) Th is is in part a product of the limited access scholars based out-
side Poland have had to archival material, and is, perhaps more importantly, a product of 
what Anikó Imre has called “widespread academic amnesia about Eastern Europe”.13) Imre 
argues that fi lms produced in the region during the Cold War period are typically seen as 
a known quantity that off ers little in the way of new points of interest to Western academ-
ics. Her diagnosis of the stagnation of the fi eld is of particular relevance to studies of the 
industrial structures of censorship in Poland, which have suff ered from academic apathy 
and from the misleading generalizations that Dina Iordanova has described as “the emerg-
ing templates of rushed historiography”.14)
It is easy to misjudge the history of the Polish fi lm industry under communism if one 
focuses exclusively on existing scholarly accounts and not on archival materials. Th e Com-
munist Party rarely publicized its reasons for modifying feature fi lms, for shelving some of 
them, or for reversing its decisions. Not only was this information confi dential but the 
very processes through which those decisions were made was clouded in mystery. Time 
and again, the drawing of rash conclusions has led to overly pessimistic historiography. 
A notable exception is the revisionist work of Paul Coates, who has argued that 
The myth [of the obtuse censor-AM] is fed […] by confusion between various in-
stances within the institution known as “censorship”: for censorship was not just the 
11) Haltof, Polish National Cinema.
12) For an exception see Paul Coates, The Red and The White: The Cinema of People’s Poland, (London & New 
York: Wallflower, 2005), pp. 74–115. 
 For Polish-langauge scholarship see Edward Zajiček, Poza ekranem: Kinematografia polska 1918–1991 (War-
szawa: Filmoteka Narodowa, Wydawnictwa Filmowe i Artystyczne, 1992); Edward Zaijček (ed.) Encyklope-
dia kultury polskiej XX wieku: Film. Kinematografia (Warszawa: Instytut Kultury, Komitet Kinematografii, 
1994); Zygmunt Machwitz, ‘Represje i opresje w kinematografii PRL’, Tygiel kultury, no.1 (1996), pp. 94–100; 
Alina Madej, Kino-władza publiczność (Bielsko Białą: Wydawnictwo Prasa Beskidzka, 2002); Małgorzata 
Hendrykowska, Kronika kinematografii polskiej 1895–1997 (Poznań: Ars Nova, 1999); Anna Misiak, ‘Cen-
zura filmowa po Zjeździe w Wiśle’, Kwartalnik filmowy, no. 43 (2003), pp. 93–102; Anna Misiak, Kinemato-
graf kontrolowany: Cenzura filmowa w kraju socjalistycznym i demokratycznym. Analiza socjologiczna (Kra-
ków: Universitas, 2006). 
13) Anikó Imre, ‘East European cinemas in new perspectives’, in Anikó Imre (ed.) East European Cinemas (New 
York & London: Routledge, 2005), p. xvi. 
14) Dina Iordanova, ‘The cinema of Eastern Europe: strained loyalties, elusive clusters’, in Anikó Imre (ed.) East 
European Cinemas (New York & London: Routledge, 2005), p. 230. 
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comments penciled in the margin by the anonymous drone of Mysia Street, it was 
also the spluttering expostulation of the Minister chairing the Script Assessment 
Commission, of his colleagues in the Central Committee or even the Politburo[.]15)
Coates draws upon archival resources painstakingly to reconstruct the process through 
which every screenplay went before it was shot. Th e close attention he pays to textual and 
institutional concerns enables Coates to revise a number of misconceptions about the top-
ic, for which he deserves credit. Nevertheless, his study could be accused of failing fully to 
distinguish the diff erent echelons of control, the responsibilities of each institution in-
volved, and their methods. As Iordanova correctly points out, most Western studies of 
Eastern Bloc fi lm censorship off er “simplistic explanations”. Her detailed analysis of fi lm 
censorship in Hungary follows Miklós Haraszty in concluding that the absence of an insti-
tution dedicated to the task led the country to develop the region’s “most sophisticated and 
elusive censorship mechanisms […]”. However, Iordanova limits her discussion of control 
of the Polish fi lm industry to a single sentence: “Poland had a special body in charge of 
media censorship, the Main Offi  ce for Control […]”.16) Furthermore, Th e BFI Companion 
to Eastern European and Russian Cinema mentions some banned Polish fi lms and explains 
that some high-profi le Polish fi lmmakers ran into problems with the censors, but says lit-
tle about the nature of these skirmishes and even less about those agencies that caused 
them.17) Crucially, the companion again gives the misleading impression that the Main Of-
fi ce for Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances (Główny Urząd Kon-
troli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk, GUKPPiW) was the principal institution responsible 
for ensuring that fi lms refl ected Party ideology. In fact, from the mid-1950s, the Main Of-
fi ce rarely viewed narrative feature fi lms in their entirety; its interventions , if any, were 
typically restricted to script development and post-production.18) Similar errors occur in 
other historical accounts. For example, David A. Cook, discusses some of the oppression 
that Polish fi lmmakers experienced under communism, but does not fully explain how 
the censoring apparatus worked. His reference to Th e Black Book of Polish Censorship — 
a collection of papers from the Main Offi  ce that were fi rst published in English in 1984 — 
again invokes the “us and them” dichotomy.19) 
Th e documents that were later included in Th e Black Book were smuggled out of Po-
land by Main Offi  ce employee Tomasz Strzyżewski. Th e Polish-language version was fi rst 
published in the west as Czarna księga cenzury PRL. It revealed the draconian and some-
15) Coates, The Red and the White, p. 75. 
16) Iordanova, Cinema of The Other Europe, pp. 33–34. See also Miklós Haraszty, The Velvet Prison: Artists under 
State Socialism (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
17) Anon., ‘Censorship in Eastern Europe’, in Richard Taylor et al (eds), The BFI Companion to Eastern Europe-
an Cinema (London: BFI, 2000), pp. 44–6.
18) These were usually overseen by changing commissions of diverse personal composition. A censor from the 
Main Office would often sit in the meetings, but his role was of advisory nature. Scattered, rather complex, 
yet loosely defined, this film censorship was a porous system and by no means as efficient as the country’s 
control of print materials, which indeed directly passed through the hands of clerks in the Main Office. 
19) David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film, 4th edition (New York & London: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2004), p. 617. See also Jane Leftwitch Curry (ed.), The Black Book of Polish Censorship, trans. Jane Leftwitch 
Curry (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).
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times quite absurd practices of censors in 1970s Poland.20) At this time, the regime of Ed-
ward Gierek allowed its investment in ideology to override rationality and to blind it to 
a rising tide of opposition. Th e Black Book portrays communist control of print journal-
ism and the media as repressive and hostile to individual creativity. Th e English-language 
translation of his book infl uenced western thinking about censoring practices in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Poland, which were mistakenly applied to cinema and rarely questioned 
thereaft er. However, Th e Black Book barely mentions feature fi lms and includes the names 
of only a handful of fi lm industry-professionals, mainly those like director Aleksander 
Ford who fl ed Poland in the late 1960s in response to increasing anti-Semitism.21) As harsh 
it may have been, their treatment was not a result of the political content of their fi lms; 
Main Offi  ce documents listed such individuals as personae non grata but made no men-
tion of their work. In addition, the Main Offi  ce was not directly involved in the censoring 
of such fi lms as Hands Up! (1967/1985) or The Devil (1972/1988), whose production 
and distribution was interrupted by authorities operating within, or in cooperation with, 
the fi lm industry. Th e absence of Polish feature fi lms from Th e Black Book can be ex-
plained by the fact that Strzyżewski worked in Cracow and not in Warsaw or Łódź, where 
the majority of narrative fi lms were made in the 1970s. Th e Black Book also demonstrates 
that the Main Offi  ce exerted minimal infl uence on issues related to fi lm. Rather, the Com-
munist Party — acting through governmental/industrial bodies — usually ensured that 
anti-communist sentiments had been purged from fi lms prior to fi nal cut, thereby render-
ing a professional censor superfl uous to requirements on nine out of ten occasions.
Despite historical evidence to the contrary, Western visions of communist fi lm censor-
ship in Poland continue to be underpinned by two fallacies: that creative freedom was un-
der continuous attack from the authorities, and that fi lmmakers and the authorities were 
completely removed from each other. Th ese fallacies were in part shaped by misleading 
accounts that were passed on by exiled Polish fi lmmakers such as Roman Polański, Jerzy 
Skolimowski, and Ryszard Bugajski. Th ey were also driven by exposure to fi lms that dram-
atized the various abuses that Polish citizens suff ered during the Cold War, including Man 
of Marble, Man of Iron, and Interrogation. Finally, Western perceptions were 
shaped by the content of Th e Black Book. 
In 1984, an issue of the fi lm magazine Cineaste featured numerous English-speaking 
critics and experts imposing on to fi lm the framework of censorship that Th e Black Book 
had described as operating in other media. It included several pieces that focused on the 
fate of the Polish fi lmmaker under martial law. It also printed interviews with prominent 
Polish critics and fi lmmakers, including writer-director Feliks Falk, who had scripted And 
All That Jazz (1981/1984), a fi lm that had been withdrawn from Polish theaters in 1981. 
In her editorial to the issue, Patricia Aufderheide highlighted “[t]he adversary [sic] rela-
tionship between Polish fi lmmakers and the Ministry of Culture”.22) Despite focusing ex-
clusively on the most draconian period in Polish history, the views that were expressed in 
20) Czarna księga cenzury PRL (London: Aneks,1977).
21) See Anna Misiak, ‘Politically involved filmmaker: Aleksander Ford and film censorship in Poland after 1945’, 
Kinema (Fall 2003), pp. 19–31. 
22) Patricia Aufderheide ‘Solidarity and the Polish cinema’, Cineaste, vol. 13, no. 3 (1984), p. 6. 
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Cineaste appear both directly and indirectly to have infl uenced the ways in which Western 
academics subsequently understood the topic, thereby giving the misleading impression 
that this fl eeting animosity between fi lmmakers and the authorities applied to the entire 
communist era.
Th is “us and them” view of Polish fi lm censorship was cemented by citing claims of an-
tagonism attributed to émigrés such as Roman Polański and Jerzy Skolimowski. For exam-
ple, in his study of Polański’s Knife in the Water (1962), Coates implies that the Party 
was hostile to the young director’s wish to dramatize youthful morality in the manner of 
French New Wave, but does not explain why it objected. He also notes in passing that 
scriptwriter Aleksander Ścibor-Rylski was against Polański’s project, but does not mention 
that this position was also held by the Head of the Central Committee’s Department of 
Culture, Wincenty Kraśko. Kraśko felt that Polański’s characters were shallow and that the 
script as a whole lacked substance. “[A]ny average journalist could write a script like this 
[…]”, suggested Kraśko, “[w]e are not going to start this production, not to mention spend 
3 million złotys on it. It is absolutely out of question”.23) Th e Party offi  cials that supported 
Kraśko’s assessment were not merely looking to hamper the development of new creative 
talent. Rather, Polański’s script failed to comply with their conservative views on youth 
morality and art cinema. Th eir disinterest in seeing public monies invested into what they 
saw as a superfi cial and frivolous production was even shared by a signifi cant number of 
fi lmmakers. Nevertheless, the Party ultimately acquiesced following the intervention of 
several established fi lmmakers, resulting in Polański making and releasing the fi lm large-
ly uncut. 
Th e cooperative character of fi lm censorship so clearly apparent in the production his-
tory of Knife in the Water is all but lost in Coates’ article, which echoes Polański’s auto-
biography by suggesting that the fi lm was “almost shelved by the Ministry of Culture”. 24) 
In reality, the threat of shelving or banning a fi lm was only ever used by the Party to nego-
tiate stronger positions, to encourage fi lmmakers to make compromises, and to ensure 
that fi lmmakers behaved frugally. Moreover, Coates neglects to mention the fact that Par-
ty offi  cials also took some steps to ensure that fi lms would be appealing to Polish viewers. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it was actually the Catholic Church — that bastion of opposition in 
communist Poland — that was critical of Polański’s fi lms, condemning Knife in the Wa-
ter on the grounds that “its shallowness excuse[d] free love”.25)
Th e Western debates that centered on binary oppositions between fi lmmakers and 
censors were fuelled by imaginary tales of a typical director’s life under communism that 
were articulated by a minority of exiled fi lmmakers. Next to the aforementioned Alek-
sander Ford, only Jerzy Skolimowski and Ryszard Bugajski felt so stifl ed by censorship that 
they chose to abandon their careers in their homeland. Th eir infl uential accounts of the 
otherwise obscure operations of the Polish fi lm industry need to be understood as prod-
ucts of quite exceptional experiences. 
23) ‘Protokół z posiedzenia Komisji Oceny Scenariuszy’, 25 kwietnia 1961, Archiwum Filmoteki Narodowej w 
Warszawie, A-214, p. 22. 
24) See Roman Polański, Roman (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1984); Paul Coates, ‘Nóż w wodzie/
Knife in the Water’, p. 83.
25) Małgorzata Hendrykowska, Kronika kinematografii polskiej 1895–1997, p. 245.
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A similar case involved Hands Up!, a fi lm that caused problems for the party when it 
went into production during the social and political upheavals of 1968. Th e authorities did 
not shelve Skolimowski’s surreal portrait of youth but did order cuts.26) It was shown in ur-
ban art houses before being withdrawn from circulation. Discussion of communist eff orts 
to derail Hands Up! surfaced time and again in the Western press, especially around 1984, 
when Skolimowski released Success is the Best Revenge (1984). Th e latter fi lm tells the 
story of Alexander Rodak, a theater director, who leaves Poland to work in England. As 
Ewa Mazierska argues, the oppressive political climate of martial law-era Poland 
“accentuate[s] Skolimowski’s identifi cation with Rodak”.27) Th e character of Rodak ex-
presses the then-prevalent notion of Poland as a country under occupation from a ruth-
less communist invader when he declares: “I want to play for Poland and help her win”. 
Th e demonization of Party offi  cials was central to the manner in which Skolimowski 
framed his experiences in Poland. Mazierska suggests that he “constructed himself in in-
terviews […] as an exile who was forced in a nomadic life by the cruel communist author-
ities and his own pride and obstinacy”.28) Th rough his fi lms and acts of self-promotion, 
Skolimowski, contributed to the sense of opposition between moral fi lmmakers and ruth-
less communist authorities, and by extension to the “us and them” dichotomy.
Th e West’s draconian image of Poland’s communist offi  cials was sealed in 1990, when 
Interrogation was shown at Cannes, some seven years aft er it was produced. Th e fi lm 
tells the story of Tonia (Krystyna Janda), who is tortured repeatedly in prison in the 1950s. 
Th is content spotlighted the brutality and absurdity of the communist practice of subju-
gating individuality and personal freedom. Based, as it was, on the most infamous period 
of communist rule, Interrogation was shelved by the authorities who feared that it 
would fuel social unrest during the already tense period in which martial law was im-
posed.29) Interrogation was cited in the aforementioned issue of Cineaste by writer Law-
rence Weschler as illustrative of the supposed antagonism that existed between Polish 
fi lmmakers and the censors.30) Th is position was developed in interviews with the fi lm’s di-
rector, who projected the experiences of the fi lm’s protagonist onto his own life. “Inter-
rogation was my manifesto”, claimed Bugajski, “I did show my vision of reality that had 
surrounded me for the most part of my life, and which was as far from my personal needs 
as possible, far from how it should be”.31) While the image of the Polish fi lm industry paint-
ed by both Cineaste and Bugajski applied only to the martial law years, it refl ects the way 
Western critics and intellectuals have framed the communist period as a whole. 
26) ‘Notatka dotycząca filmu Jerzego Skolimowskiego Ręce do góry oraz filmu publicystyczno-dokumentalnego 
Tadeusza Jaworskiego Sekretarz,’ Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, KC PZPR Wydział Kultury, 237/
XVIII/262.
27) Ewa Mazierska, ‘Polish martial law of 1981 seen from abroad’, p. 204. 
28) Ewa Mazierska, Jerzy Skolimowski: The Cinema of a Non-conformist (New York & Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 
pp. 21–2. 
29) Małgorzata Hendrykowska, Kronika kinematografii polskiej 1895–1997, p. 390. 
30) Lawrence Weschler, ‘Poland’s banned films’, Cineaste, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 11–12. 
31) Ryszard Bugajski quoted in “Przesłuchanie”, available at <filmpolski.pl/fp/index.php/123101> [Accessed on 
10 April 2012].
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The Origins of  the System: The Party and the Film Units
 
Th e foundations of Poland’s centrally managed fi lm industry were laid within a half a year 
of the end of WWII. Th e nationalization of the Polish production, distribution, and exhi-
bition sectors was accompanied by the founding of the state company Film Polski 
(Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe). It replaced the short-lived Department of Film Propagan-
da, which had previously overseen fi lm production and the exhibition.32) In the early Sta-
linist years, the Polish government followed the Soviet model of censorship and propagan-
da, as the Main Offi  ce for Control worked with the Head of Film Polski Aleksander Ford 
to ensure the ideological soundness of the handful of fi lms that were being made at the 
time. Th is model was stringent and relied heavily on the political and artistic judgment of 
Ford. Because it proved to be less eff ective than Stalinist offi  cials had hoped, the Party 
swift ly took control out of the hands of Film Polski and the Main Offi  ce. Even at this ear-
ly stage, it had become clear that a lack of communication between state bodies and fi lm-
makers was leading to stagnation in the fi lm industry; centralized control was having a sti-
fl ing eff ect on creativity. To stimulate Polish cinema, the authorities started gradually to 
pay more and more attention to the views of fi lmmakers. Th is process of integration may 
have been gradual at fi rst, but it paved the way for subsequent developments.
By 1947, Polish fi lm industry professionals recognized that the Party would play an in-
creasingly important role in their working lives. Th at year, the Film Sub-committee was 
established within the Department of Education and Culture (Wydział Oświaty i Kultury 
Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, KC PPR).33) It was responsible for plan-
ning fi lm production and deciding whether fi lms were fi t for distribution.34) Where im-
ports needed to be approved by the Movie Rental Central (Centrala Wynajmu Filmów), 
domestic features now required verifi cation from various commissions that had been set 
up to evaluate the ideological and artistic credentials of scripts and completed fi lms. Al-
though the composition of the controlling bodies changed over time, the centralized sys-
tem of fi lm censorship remained in place during communist rule.
Nevertheless, in 1949, communist authorities made one fi nal attempt to make Polish 
fi lms subject to the type of incontestable ideological control that was in place in the Sovi-
et Union. During the Congress of Filmmakers in Wisła, socialist realism was declared to 
be an ideological and artistic benchmark for Polish cinema; a political and aesthetic mod-
el that would drive the post-war restoration of the nation’s fi lm industry.35) Th is ideologi-
cal mode of storytelling was to be implemented by the Party in a propagandistic manner. 
Approved scripts would be scrutinized to ensure that only those that promoted socialism 
32) ‘Dekret z dnia 13 listopada 1945 o utworzeniu PP Film Polski’, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, MKiS 
Generalna Dyrekcja Filmu Polskiego, Biuro Organizacyjno-Prawne, 1945, 102a. 
33) ‘Notatka tow. Trojanowskiego w sprawie Filmu Polskiego’, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, PPR, 295/
XVII/10. 
34) After the Unification Congress of 1948 (Zjazd Zjednoczeniowy Polskiej Partii Robotniczej /PPR/ i Polskiej 
Partii Socjalistycznej /PPS/), the Party was officially renamed the Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjed-
noczona Partia Robotnicza PZPR). It was also restructured and reorganized. The Department of Culture 
and Education was renamed the Central Committee’s Department of Culture (Wydział Kultury KC PZPR) 
but remained responsible for film production in Poland..
35) See Anna Misiak, ‘Cenzura filmowa po Zjeżdzie w Wiśle’, Kwartalnik filmowy, no.43 (2003), pp. 93–102. 
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went into production. Th e Department of Culture sought greater control over the fi lm in-
dustry by announcing what it dubbed “the primacy of script writing over directing”. In 
a speech during the Congress of Filmmakers, renowned fi lm critic Jerzy Toeplitz declared: 
“Th e director serves as a creator of the screen interpretation of a literary text. Th is literary 
text at the core of any fi lm is the screenplay”.36) Th e Party also attempted to persuade some 
directors to produce fi lms that would encourage viewers to support the new political sys-
tem. 
Party eff orts to promote socialist realism oft en disrupted production. For example, di-
rector Wanda Jakubowska was involved in such protracted discussions with the Party and 
the Polish army that her WWII epic Soldier of Victory lost much of its topical reso-
nance when it was fi nally released in 1953. Th is type of case was by no means unique. Ef-
forts to tighten the Party’s control of fi lm content oft en met with resistance from fi lmmak-
ers, which led to countless impasses, such as in 1952, when feature fi lm production ground 
to a halt. In response to these problems, Film Polski was replaced by the Central Offi  ce of 
Cinema (Centralny Urząd Kinematografi i). Th e Department of Culture concluded that it 
needed either to relax its control of the industry or to accept that feature fi lm production 
might have to be sacrifi ced all together.
Th e death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin precipitated a measure of liberalization in the 
Soviet Union and its satellites which in turn hastened the death of Polish socialist realism. 
Th is shift  exerted a profound infl uence over the ways in which the Party sought to control 
Polish fi lm production. In the early post-Stalin years, the authorities increased their eff orts 
to forge a working relationship with fi lmmakers by reintegrating them into the decision-
making process. Th is step, which departed from the Soviet model, proved to be so eff ec-
tive that it remained in place until Communism fell in 1989. While the power that fi lm-
makers believed they held was sometimes illusionary, their opinions were consistently 
taken into account. To foster relations with fi lmmakers, the Party relaxed its vetting of 
screenplays and placed fi lmmakers in charge of shooting and postproduction. In 1955, the 
Central Offi  ce of Cinema founded fi lm units — creative cooperatives that specialized in 
the production of narrative features — and, in so doing, it offi  cially recognized the impor-
tance of creative talent.37) Th e offi  ce also put in place opportunities for negotiation be-
tween fi lmmakers and the authorities, which for the most part remained in place until 
1989. As Bolesław Michałek and Frank Turaj observed: 
In the 1950s, [t]here was no change to the notion of cinema as a socially engaged 
activity, but it was desired that the control and administration, as much as possible, 
be in the hands of film directors, writers and cameramen. In short, filmmakers were 
looking for relief from government officials. The government accepted the idea.38) 
Although the number and composition of the fi lm units changed over the years, they 
operated with remarkable stability. 
36) Jerzy Toeplitz, ‘Walka o film realizmu socjalistycznego’, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, KC PZPR, 
Wydział Kultury, 237/XVIII/31.
37) ‘Informacja o sytuacji kinematografii,’ Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, KC PZPR, 237/XVIII/117.
38) Bolesław Michałek and Frank Turaj, The Modern Cinema of Poland, p. xviii. 
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In the post-Stalin years, the Polish fi lm industry was managed by the Chief Board of 
Cinema (Naczelny Zarząd Kinematografi i). Th is body was established in 1956 to replace 
the Central Offi  ce of Cinema.39) Th e Head of the Chief Board served as the producer of all 
Polish feature fi lms and the principal fi nancier of the industry. He was responsible to the 
Minister of Culture and was in charge of distributing funds to the units. Due to the large 
number of fi lms produced aft er 1956, the fi lm industry functioned as a separate, almost fi -
nancially self-suffi  cient entity. 
In 1958, a new system of fi nancing was introduced to stimulate the more effi  cient pro-
duction of interesting fi lms. It linked funding to the economic performance of the units, 
to the artistic and ideological qualities of their fi lms, and to the size of the audience those 
fi lms attracted. Production fi nancing was therefore determined by levels of prior success 
at the Polish box offi  ce, which, by implication, indicated a fi lm’s capacity to reach out to 
the popular audience. Although this practice provided monetary rewards based on the 
ideological or commercial prowess of a given fi lm, it did not directly aff ect fi lmmakers’ 
salaries, which were not linked to the box offi  ce performances of their fi lms. Unit employ-
ees received fi xed monthly salaries related to qualifi cations and experience, providing 
them with a measure of fi nancial security regardless of whether they made hits or fl ops.40) 
Th e fi lm units only stopped production on two occasions. Th e fi rst of these occasions 
was the result of stricter control of fi lm industry-insiders that followed an upsurge in an-
ti-Semitism and an intensifi cation of Party eff orts to target “enemies of the state” in 1968; 
there was a heavy Jewish presence in the industry at the time, and, ironically, the most 
high-profi le casualty of this prejudice was Aleksander Ford, the man who had redesigned 
the Polish fi lm industry aft er WWII.41) In a March 1968 speech to the Politburo, the First 
Secretary Władysław Gomułka criticized Polish culture for what he saw as its liberalism, 
cosmopolitism, and Zionism. Th e fi lm industry was not granted immunity from this soci-
ety-wide witch-hunt. Against the backdrop of growing nationalism and xenophobia, the 
Party targeted several fi lmmakers who had participated in co-productions with Western 
nations. Furthermore, to avoid exile, well known directors such as Jan Rybkowski, Wanda 
Jakubowska, and Jerzy Kawalerowicz were forced to engage in public self-criticism; under 
Gomułka, it was not uncommon to preempt or curtail opposition by forcing alleged ene-
mies of the state to confess the error of their ways and to swear allegiance to the Party. Fi-
nally, the old units were replaced by new production groups dubbed “commissioners’ 
units” (zespoły komisarzy) that were managed by Party loyalists.42) 
Th e industry was reorganized in 1972, when fi lm directors were once again put in 
charge of the units.43) Th is new structure comprised seven units, each led by a famous in-
dustry fi gure: the “Illuzjon” unit was run by Czesław Petelski, “Tor” by Stanisław Różewicz, 
“X” by Andrzej Wajda, “Panorama” by Jerzy Passendorfer, “Silesia” by Kazimierz Kutz, 
“Prymat” by Aleksander Ścibor-Rylski, and “Kadr” by Jerzy Kawalerowicz. Th ese fi lm-
39) The most commonly used translations of the names of these two bodies are also used here, although other 
authors may use different English names, including the Chief Board of Cinematography (NZK) and the 
Central Office of Cinema (CUK). 
40) See Edward Zajiček, Poza ekranem: Kinematografia polska 1918–1991, pp.162–7.
41) See Misiak, ‘Aleksander Ford and film censorship in Poland after 1945’, pp. 19–31. 
42) Małgorzata Hendrykowska, Kronika kinematografii polskiej 1895–1997, p. 283.
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makers wielded considerable infl uence over the industry as their positions of power per-
mitted them to negotiate with the Party. Th e new political climate led to a relaxation of 
control that allowed for the production of fi lms such as 1977’s Man of Marble, which 
appeared from a Western perspective to bite the hand that fed them. In such cases, Party 
offi  cials were willing to make concessions based on what they saw as a fi lm’s exceptional 
artistic merits. Supporting such fi lms, in spite of their political positions, was deemed 
preferable to dealing with a backlash from fi lmmakers and audiences that would likely be 
provoked if they were banned. As Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz explained “[Man of 
Marble] is politically wrong, but very attractive in terms of its artistic values. Th e masses 
will want to see it”.44) At this time, the fi lm’s director Andrzej Wajda was seen as one of Po-
land’s most accomplished fi lmmakers. Moreover, Man of Marble had received consid-
erable publicity while in production, and rumors had spread about its political themes. 
Under these circumstances, the Party wanted to avoid playing into opposition hands by 
giving dissenters a readymade example of the state restricting creative freedom. Rather 
than fooling the censors, Wajda cleverly exploited the political climate and the Party’s de-
sire to secure international praise for innovative Polish cinema; the communists’ promo-
tion of art fi lms was refl ected consistently in the conduct of the censors, but perhaps nev-
er more so than in the second half of the 1970s, when contributions to the Cinema of 
Moral Concern fi rst hit Polish screens. Films such as Camouflage (1977), Top Dog, 
Without Anesthesia (both 1978), Provincial Actors (1979), and A Lonely Woman 
(1981) may have been highly critical of the regime, but little evidence exists to suggest that 
their emergence was a symptom of the Party suspending its control of Polish cinema, or of 
the Department of Culture suddenly taking its eye of the ball. Such fi lms were made with 
the full knowledge of the regime. Party control remained in place, but was superseded by 
eff orts to foster a world renowned fi lm culture, an ambition of the Party’s since the early 
1950s. Th e Cinema of Moral Concern was therefore clearly facilitated by Party offi  cials.45)
Th e second interruption of Polish fi lm production came on 13 December 1981 when 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law. Th e units were not closed, but the Par-
ty did monitor fi lmmakers more closely than it had previously done. Moreover, some fi lms 
were withdrawn from circulation and suspected subversives were removed from the 
units.46) Among them were Andrzej Wajda, whose Film Unit “X” was shut down in 1983, 
and Krzysztof Kieślowski, who was dismissed from Film Unit “Tor” that year.47) Th ese 
measures may have been oppressive — even tyrannical — but they were short-lived. From 
1984 to the end of communist rule in 1989, the Polish fi lm industry reverted to pre-mar-
tial law models of production and censorship.
43) Michalek and Turaj, The Modern Cinema of Poland, p. 50. 
44) Piotr Jaroszewicz quoted in Małgorzata Hendrykowska, Kronika kinematografii polskiej 1895–1997, p. 346.
45) See Dobrochna Dabert, Kino moralnego niepokoju. Wokół wybranych problemów poetyki i etyki (Poznań: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2003). 
46) ‘Filmy fabularne, których ekspoatację wstrzymano po 13 grudnia 1981 roku,’ Archiwum Akt Nowych 
w Warszawie, KC PZPR Wydział Kultury, 889/32; ‘Zespoły filmowe 1981/1982,’ Archiwum Akt Nowych 
w Warszawie, KC PZPR Wydział Kultury, 909/65.
47) Edward Zajiček, Poza ekranem. Kinematografia polska 1918–1991, p. 248. 
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The Approval Process: From Script to Screen
Apart from a brief period in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and when martial law was im-
posed in the early 1980s, fi lm units were an integral part of Polish cinema under commu-
nism. Th ey were intended to be production clusters that facilitated partnerships between 
professionals who possessed diff erent skill-sets. Th ese fully subsidized cooperatives en-
joyed relative creative freedom during shooting, even if the end-product of their labor 
needed to be ratifi ed by the communist authorities. Having invested time, energy, and 
capital in making a fi lm, the authorities were reluctant to block its distribution and exhi-
bition. Th ey therefore, tended to rely on preemptive measures that eliminated controver-
sial material during production. Conversely, Polish fi lmmakers sought to remain true to 
their creative agenda, which sometimes meant fashioning fi lms that would off er audienc-
es views that were critical of either the regime or Polish society. It was in neither side’s in-
terest to shelve a fi lm during production. Such a step could destroy a fi lmmaker’s career, as 
had been the case with Jerzy Skolimowski, who had clashed with the censors during the 
making of Hands Up! (1967/1985), and with Ryszard Bugajski, who had done so when 
producing Interrogation. In most cases, the process of censoring was a balancing act, 
rather than all out confl ict. On the whole, the Party practiced preventative — as opposed 
to oppressive — measures, which Polish fi lm critic Jerzy Płażewski dubbed “prophylactic 
criticism”.48)
Every fi lm that was destined for public exhibition in Poland went through offi  cial 
channels of verifi cation on two occasions prior to release. First, the screenplay had to be 
approved at several levels before production started (see Figure 1). As with scripts, fi rst full 
edits of fi lms had to be handed over to the authorities so that their ideological and artistic 
credentials could be considered. Decisions made by the relevant committee determined 
the fate of a fi lm and would usually inform those at the upper echelons of the political hi-
erarchy, in the event that such a  step was deemed necessary (see Figure 2). As Coates 
points out, “[i]n Poland […] there was no on-set Soviet style inspector to ensure the con-
gruence between the approved script and what was actually shot. And once a work had 
been fi lmed, it was always on the cards that it would be shown”.49) Th e release of most fi lms 
was secured by the consultations that were built into this framework; Th e Party relied on 
expert advice from an ever-changing roster of critics, scholars, and writers that included 
Jan Kott, Jerzy Toeplitz, Jerzy Putrament, Jerzy Andrzejewski, and Stanisław Dygat, as well 
as fi lm industry professionals, who were oft en given the opportunity to defend their fi lms. 
Th e artistic and ideological control of a fi lm began during project development. Each 
unit featured a Programming Board that was responsible for approving scripts before they 
were presented to the Commission for Evaluating Scripts and Films (Komisja Ocen Sce-
nariuszy i Filmów) (see Figure 1).
Th e Commission for Evaluating Scripts and Films underwent reform on several occa-
sions following its establishment in 1952.50) It should be noted that in the 1950s the De-
48) Jerzy Płażewski quoted in Janina Falkowska, Andrzej Wajda: History, Politics and Nostalgia in Andrzej Wajda 
Films (Oxford & New York, Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 167. 
49) Coates, The Red and the White, p.74. 
50) Edward Zajiček, Poza ekranem. Kinematografia polska 1918–1991, p. 109.
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Revisions
Revisions
partment of Culture and the Chief Board of Cinema considered the screenplay to be the 
central component of narrative fi lm production, more important in fact than the fi lm it-
self. In 1957, the commission focused on scripts, and dropped the term “fi lm” from its 
name. Th e Commission for Evaluating Scripts (Komisja Ocen Scenariuszy), as it was 
henceforth known, temporarily operated independent of the Commission for Approval of 
Feature Films (Komisja do Odbioru Filmów Fabularnych Długometrażowych).51) Howev-
er, in an eff ort to bring greater effi  ciency to the system and to prevent fi lmmakers from 
disregarding the recommendations of the Commission for Evaluating Scripts when they 
were shooting fi lms, the two commissions were reunifi ed in 1973 under the title of the 
Commission for Evaluating Cinematic Films (Komisja Ocen Fabularnych Filmów Kinow-
ych) (see Figure 2).52) Despite these changes, the process of approving scripts and complet-
ed fi lms did not diff er substantially during communist rule, even though at certain times, 
such as in the late 1960s and 1970s, scripts were vetted by reviewers at the Chief Board of 
Figure 1: A Typical Script Approval Process (Pre-production)
DECISION MAKING PROCESS (SCRIPT)
Department of Culture
KC PZPR Screenwriter / Director
Programming Board
in the Production Unit
Commision for Evaluating Scripts/Films 
(+ the Chief Board Scripts Reviewers)
Head of Chief Board of Cinema (NZK) 








51) ‘Tryb ocen filmów fabularnych (referat na Kolegium NZK w dniu 17 stycznia 1961), Archiwum Akt Nowych 
w Warszawie, NZK, 1/24.
52) ‘Zarządzenie nr 27 MKiS z dnia 31 marca 1973 w sprawie powołania i zasad działania Komisji Oceny Fabu-
larnych Filmów Kinowych, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, NZK, 4/14.
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Cinema before they were discussed at commission meetings. While some screenplays 
were rejected, the bodies that handled completed fi lms tended to call for revisions based 
on issues of art or ideology so that fi lms could be resubmitted rather than rejected out-
right.
Some screenplays were withdrawn from consideration because writers found it impos-
sible to accept the Commission’s negative evaluation of their work or because they were 
deemed to boast little interest to Polish audiences. For example, Stanisław Dygat withdrew 
from consideration his script Jezioro Bodeńskie, “I came to the conclusion that I am not 
well suited to work in fi lm”, he protested, “[i]f I write a book, it is my own personal project. 
In the fi lm industry the situation is diff erent. My own criteria diff er from those proposed 
by the industry and by my fi lm colleagues.53) Cases like Jezioro Bodeńskie were, however, 
quite uncommon. Typically, scripts were shot, albeit sometimes years later, as happened 
with Man of Marble, which took a decade and half to go before the cameras. Th e com-
mission generally aimed to complete rather than forestall what it considered to be strong 
projects. Moreover, the Head of the Chief Board of Cinema rarely exercised his power to 
Corrections
CorrectionsCorrectionsShelved
Figure 2: Typical Film Approval Process (Pre-release)




in the Production Unit
Commision for Evaluating (Scripts and Cinematic) 
Films Kolaudacja (Pre-release screening)
Head of Chief Board of Cinema (NZK) 




53) ‘Protokół z posiedzenia Komisji Ocen Scenariuszy’, 10 May 1960, Iluzjon, no. 3–4 (1994), 105–112.
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veto a script if reviewers and the commission had concluded that it was suffi  ciently artis-
tic or appealing to audiences (see Figure 1). 
Th e dual role of the commission — as censor and an advisor to the body that distrib-
uted state subsidies to fi lmmakers — has given rise to a number of misunderstandings in 
Western scholarship. Primary documentation shows that it were artistic shortcomings 
rather than political issues that prevented some screenplays from reaching the screen. Th e 
number of screenplays that were accepted but not ultimately fi lmed or distributed in-
creased signifi cantly from the late 1960s to the mid 1970s. Th e period is oft en cited to sup-
port claims that the Chief Board of Cinema abused his power. However, it was in fact 
marked by stricter control of the fi lm industry generally, which, as noted above, had also 
seen an increase in the creative control granted to the commissioners that were placed in 
charge of the new units; commissioners who proved to be wholly incapable of producing 
fi lmable scripts or releasable quality fi lms. Th ese circumstances highlighted the need for 
genuine creative talent within the units, thereby paving the way for many renowned direc-
tors to return to the roles they had previously held in the industry. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to documents housed at the Department of Culture (Wydział Kultury KC PZPR), over 
twenty scripts that were accepted between 1974 and the fi rst half of 1976 were never 
shot.54) Th e industry did however pick up at decade’s end, when control loosened as part 
of the more liberal political climate of the late 1970s. In general though, during politically 
stable times, scripts that were greenlighted by the commission were shot, not least because 
directors recognized that it was prudent to follow the commission’s recommendations in 
order to safeguard their own careers.
Even though the minutes of Programming Board meetings are unavailable, it is likely 
that some projects were rejected on artistic grounds before they left  the unit. Prior to the 
1970s, stories were developed by professional scriptwriters who also wrote novels or short 
stories. Many scripts were adapted from novels or short stories, sometimes by their origi-
nal author, as in the case of The Eight Day of The Week (1958/1983), Ashes and Dia-
monds (1958), and How to Be Loved (1963), which were adapted respectively by Marek 
Hłasko, Jerzy Andrzejewski, and Kazimierz Brandys. In contrast, few fi lms were inspired 
by story ideas that came from the Department of Culture (see Figure 1), a notable excep-
tion being the Polish-Russian co-production Last Drop of Blood (1978).55) Th is prac-
tice shows that the Party intervened into creative matters to a lesser degree than one might 
expect.
Whereas directors rarely wrote scripts at the beginning of the Cold War, a more direc-
tor-driven model of screenwriting was starting to take shape by the 1970s. At this time, di-
rectors including Wojciech Marczewski, Agnieszka Holland, Janusz Kijowski, Krzysztof 
Kieślowski, and Feliks Falk, all penned their own screenplays. Of course, these scripts also 
went before the Programming Board, which had the right to ask for changes to be made 
to them (see Figure 1). In the interests of time management, modifi cations were made be-
fore the script in question was ready to be passed over to the Commission and/or the re-
54) ‘Scenariusze nieskierowane do produkcji’, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, NZK, 5/94.
55) Notatka infomacyjna na temat filmu J. Hoffmana Do krwi ostatniej’, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, 
KC PZPR Wydział Kultury, 832/93.
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viewers at the Chief Board of Cinema (see Figure 1). When such projects had been shot 
and edited, they underwent the same process of approval that began at the Programming 
Board (see Figure 2). Th e Commission for Evaluating (Scripts and) (Cinematic) Films 
may in principle have served as an advisor to the Head of the Chief Board of Cinema but 
in practice its recommendations were rarely dismissed (see Figure 2) for the simple fact 
that the Politburo and the Ministry of Culture trusted its views. Th e Commission paired 
a small number of Party offi  cials with renowned fi lmmakers and critics. For example, in 
the second half of the 1970s, Commission members included prominent directors such as 
Andrzej Wajda, Krzysztof Zanssi, Jerzy Antczak, Kazimierz Kutz, Wanda Jakubowska, and 
Jerzy Kawalerowicz. Known in Polish as kolaudacje, the formal meetings of the Commis-
sion were preceded by pre-release screenings and concluded with a formal decision that 
was made by the chair of the proceedings; sometimes the chair was the Head of the De-
partment of Culture, other times the Head of the Chief Board, and, in the case of the 
1970s, the Director of the Programming and Distribution Department at the Chief Board. 
Although Party representatives held unquestionably strong positions at the meetings, 
their feedback was not merely oppressive but also constructive insofar as it was intended 
to improve the look, sound, and structure of the fi lm under discussion. Directors were — 
along with their mangers, a creative supervisor, and the director of the fi lm unit — typi-
cally invited to attend Commission meetings about their fi lms. Th e commission’s invest-
ment in issues that fell beyond strictly Party political concerns is exemplifi ed by a meeting 
that took place in 1960 to consider a script about a nun haunted by the devil that was re-
leased as Mother Joan of the Angels (1961), during which the commission expressed 
concerns about the fi lm’s capacity to anger the Catholic Church. Kolaudacje gave Party of-
fi cials their fi rst opportunity to view feature fi lms. Apart from a brief period in the 1960s, 
when the Commission examined rushes (rough footage), the Party did not supervise the 
pre-production, shooting or the post-production of feature fi lms.56) As with scripts, man-
datory revisions were oft en requested. However, a fi lm would only be sent to the Chief 
Board of the Cinema, who had the authority to demand revisions, if a fi lmmaker had re-
fused to comply with requests. Th e Politburo only intervened in exceptional cases that had 
not been dealt with by the various forms of pre- and post-production verifi cation (see Fig-
ure 2). Th ese circumstances help to explain why so few fi lms were shelved by the Central 
Committee.
Th e Communist Party was nevertheless not entirely separated from the various stages 
of fi lm production or from the process of control, because it had members on all of the 
commissions and in all of the units (see Figure 3). Although many Polish citizens were 
Party members, they did not necessarily subscribe to communist ideology. Th e extent to 
which they cooperated with the authorities therefore hinged on both the roles they played 
within the system, as well as their personal commitment to communist ideology. While 
some fi lmmakers were Party members, it did not follow that their creative contributions 
were driven by a political agenda. In contrast each commission boasted Party members 
who acted on behalf of the authorities. Th e presence on the commissions of both “inert” 
56) ‘Tryb ocen filmów fabularnych (referat na Kolegium NZK w dniu 17 stycznia 1961), Archiwum Akt Nowych 
w Warszawie, NZK, 1/24.
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and “active” Party members ensured that Party leadership possessed a solid sense of the 
direction a production was taking. Archival documents do however indicate that when 
martial law was not in eff ect, Party leadership tended to rely on formal channels — and 
not the grapevine — to keep check of fi lmmakers. In this sense, they had probably learned 
much from the Stalin years, when stricter forms of control had led to stagnation.
Given that it had high-ranking members imbedded in funding and control bodies, as 
well as in the fi lm industry, it is fairly safe to conclude that the Party itself masterminded 
the system (see Figure 3). Such a conclusion explains why employees of the Department of 
Culture were the most active contributors when it came to evaluating the artistic and ide-
ological credentials of a given fi lm. It also explains why the Head of the Department of 
Culture had the power to advise the Minister of Culture and the Politburo to authorize the 
cutting or shelving of a fi lm during times of political crisis. Th is model of controlling fi lm 
remained in place throughout Communist rule. 
In a manner that recalled Lenin’s declaration of cinema’s primacy among the arts, the 
Polish government made every eff ort to stimulate fi lm, albeit in ways that benefi tted the 
Party. As long as fi lms followed the unwritten rule of not opposing the system in a direct 
way, the communist government provided a safety net, even when Polish cinema seemed 
to be unsustainable. For example, during an economic crisis in the late 1970s, the Council 
of Ministers (Rada Ministrów) passed an act establishing a new central source of fi lm fi -
nancing, ensuring the survival of the units irrespective of how their fi lms fared with audi-
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ences. Cinema therefore remained well funded and capable of competing against its new 
leisure time competitor, television. Th e Party was once again able to balance its role as 
controller and patron, before changing its approach in the late 1970s when opposition to 
the Party developed into the unifi ed Solidarity movement that contributed to the fall of 
communism. Th e Party’s wish to excel in the sphere of fi lm led the Department of Culture 
to compose numerous alarmist memoranda in which they expressed what they saw as an 
unacceptable paucity of greenlighted scripts: so-called screenplay crises (kryzysy scenari-
uszowe). Concerns of this sort reveal that the Party actually over-fi nanced the Polish fi lm 
industry, thereby preventing cash-fl ow problems and guaranteeing its existence through-
out the Cold War period. 
Some screenplay crises were caused by the commission’s overly strict forms of verifi ca-
tion. During the fi rst half of the 1960s, for example, an over-representation of hardliners 
in the commission resulted in a near-50% rejection rate. In 1960 alone, only 25 of the 42 
submitted screenplays were actually permitted to go into production. Th e following year, 
only 33 of 61 were greenlighted. Instead of accepting its own culpability in this period of 
stagnation, the Party placed the blame squarely on industry decision-makers;57) the Party 
believed that it was fulfi lling its obligations so long as production capital was available and 
no oppositional fi lms were being made. Th e ideologues’ refusal to accept even partial re-
sponsibility for the situation was emblematic of the Communist Party’s tendency to cover 
up the negative consequences its political interference had on creative practice.
Th e Department of Culture recognized that undermining the creative control of fi lm-
makers was not without its problems, even if offi  cial acknowledgement was not forthcom-
ing. For this reason, the manner in which the department executed its powers tended to 
oscillate between periods of rigid adherence to Party ideology and a  more relaxed ap-
proach. Many a  time, minor rewrites or cuts allowed a previously rejected script to be 
greenlighted or a banned fi lm to be released. Along with Central Committee policy shift s, 
the composition of the various bodies also underwent change. Financially secure fi lm-
makers oft en insisted on negotiating over their projects, especially aft er 1973 when the 
Ministry of Culture’s newly ratifi ed Directive 27 stated that the Commission for Evaluat-
ing Films was required to inform a  unit about the grounds for approving or rejecting 
a fi lm or for calling for revisions to be made to it.58) Once the rational was spelled out, dis-
cussions could open between a unit and the Chief Board of Cinema and/or the Depart-
ment of Culture.
Th e infl uence a fi lmmaker wielded among Party offi  cials was usually determined by 
his reputation and the perceived quality of his oeuvre. Established industry luminaries 
such as Andrzej Wajda therefore tended to hold greater sway than a fi rst time director or 
one who had had a strained relationship with the authorities. As long as the political cli-
mate was fairly relaxed, this position of power could be used to make fi lms that were crit-
ical of the Party. For example, Wajda’s disapproving fi lms Man of Marble and Man of 
Iron encountered only slight delays before being released, because this director, who en-
57) Untitled document, Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, KC PZPR Wydział Kultury, 237/XVIII/262. 
58) ‘Zarządzenie nr 27 MKiS z dnia 31 marca 1973 w sprawie powołania i zasad działania Komisji Ocen Fabu-
larnych Filmów Kinowych,’ Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, NZK, 4/14.
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joyed a high standing in Polish fi lm culture, had longstanding relations with Party offi  cials 
and held pragmatic views on compromise. Unlike Wajda, newcomers to the industry and 
recently arrived émigré fi lmmakers struggled to get politically critical projects released. 
For example, production of Andrzej Żuławski’s The Silver Globe (1977/1989) was 
stopped just as Polish audiences were given the opportunity to view Wajda’s fi lms. While 
these decisions may appear paradoxical, they were rationalized by the institutionalized 
mechanisms of control upon which the Party relied to protect its political and fi nancial in-
terests. In this case, Żuławski’s relationship with the Party had already been strained by his 
production of the ideologically critical fi lm The Devil and by his inability to prevent the 
fi lm from going over-budget. Factors such as these highlight the extent to which context-
dependent logic underpinned the decision-making process. Lack of awareness of these 
conditions has led Westerners to conclude that the system was riddled with absurdities. 
Even if fi nancial issues were not raised, it was clear to fi lmmakers and the authorities that 
the monopoly the Party enjoyed in the spheres of fi lm production and distribution gave it 
major leverage during discussions between the two sides. Th e Party’s primary objectives 
were to erase signs of dissent, and to maintain and promote the political system.
Conclusion: Sophisticated and Elusive Control with Artistic Ambitions
To date, Anglophone historiography has relied on early Polish writings and the claims of 
émigré fi lmmakers to paint a partial and misrepresentative picture of Polish fi lm censor-
ship under communism. At the same time, ‘academic amnesia’, as Imre called it, has exag-
gerated the opposition that existed between fi lmmakers and the authorities. However, 
through a close examination of archival documents, this essay has shown that irrespective 
of how oppressive Polish fi lm censorship may have been at this time, it was also character-
ized by negotiations between fi lmmakers and Party offi  cials that were intended to protect 
state investments in motion picture production. 
Marek Hendrykowski has considered the extent to which a sense of interdependency 
shaped relations between Polish fi lmmakers and the communist government, and how it 
off ered potential benefi ts to both sides.59) Although the broad scope of his work prevents 
Hendrykowski from reconstructing the operations that comprised this system, his obser-
vations nevertheless develop current understandings of Polish fi lm censorship. Hend-
rykowski’s observation on a mutual tradition of ascribing supreme value to individual cre-
ativity helps to explain the similarities between the Polish system and that which Haraszty 
has described as operating in 1980s Hungary.60) Th e case of Polish fi lm censorship sup-
ports Iordanova’s conclusions of the “sophisticated and elusive” character of other Eastern 
European systems of censorship.61) 
59) Marek Hendrykowski, ‘Changing states in East Central Europe’, in Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (ed.) The Oxford 
History of World Cinema: The Definitive History of Cinema Worldwide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), pp. 632–640.
60) Hendrykowski, ‘Changing states in East Central Europe’, p. 633;Miklós Haraszty, The Velvet Prison: Artists 
Under State Socialism (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
61) Iordanova, Cinema of the Other Europe, p. 34.
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Th e belief that fi lmmakers should fi rst and foremost be treated as artists helped to 
shape the institutional structure of Polish fi lm censorship and to open up the possibility 
for negotiation between fi lmmakers and the authorities. Both sides used the notion of the 
fi lmmaker as artist to serve their respective needs. On the one hand, communist offi  cials 
mainly encouraged fi lmmakers to make fi lms of a high quality that promised to promote 
the regime, not dull political pictures but ones that stood to generate prestige for the state 
by winning awards at international festivals. On the other, fi lmmakers would invoke 
“artistic values” as leverage to convince the Party of the merits of their work. For these very 
reasons, when martial law was not in eff ect, a place existed in communist Poland for fi lms 
that were critical of the regime.
While scholars have focused on Polish fi lm censorship during times of political crisis, 
signifi cantly less attention has been paid to comparatively relaxed periods, during which 
many important fi lms were produced. Th e overview of processes of control that has been 
outlined above is intended to contribute to an ongoing program of revisionist Western 
historiography that will enrich understandings of the Polish fi lm industry. 
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SUMMARY 
The Polish Film Industry under Communist Control
Conceptions and Misconceptions of Censorship 
Anna Misiak
Th is essay makes use of archival documents and existing historiography to provide an overview of 
the institutional framework of fi lm censorship that operated in Poland during the Cold War era. In 
contrast to scholarship that portrays the relationship between fi lmmakers and censors in terms of 
a “them and us” mentality, I demonstrate that at this time control of Polish narrative cinema resid-
ed in the interaction of the Party and the nation’s fi lm industry. I argue that the censorship and mod-
ifi cation of Polish fi lms was bound up with the ways in which the state distributed production sub-
sidies, and was underwritten by negotiation between fi lmmakers and the authorities. While the 
system was oft en quite oppressive, its standards changed over time, and were oft en relatively fl exible. 
Ultimately, the essay seeks to counter myths that remain prevalent in Western scholarship by intro-
ducing international readers to positions that have been developed in Polish revisionist fi lm histori-
ography.
